Сапир Ж. (2025). Экономический спад в странах Европы: глобальные причины и локальный контекст // Экономические и социальные перемены: факты, тенденции, прогноз. Т. 18. № 3. С. 65–84. DOI: 10.15838/esc.2025.3.99.3
Albrizio S., Bluedorn J.C., Koch C., Pescatori A., Stuermer M. (2022). Market size and supply disruptions: Sharing the pain of a potential Russian gas shut-off to the European Union. IMF Working Papers, WP/22/143.
Alessandri P., Gazzani A.G. (2023). Natural Gas and the Macroeconomy: Not All Energy Shocks Are Alike. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4549079
Alessi L., Benczur P., Campolongo F. et al. (2020). The resilience of EU member states to the financial and economic crisis. Social Indicators Research, 148(2), 569–598.
Allain J. (2020). Réindustrialiser la France L’exemple d’une ville moyenne, Bourges. Les Analyses de Population & Avenir, 28(10), 1–18.
Artus P., (2024). Economics: Why Europe is falling behind the USA. Polytechnique Insight. Available at: https://www.polytechnique-insights.com/en/columns/economy/economy-why-europe-is-falling-behind-the-usa/
Askenazy P., Cupillard E., Houriez G., Jeauneau Y., Roucher D. (2024). A la recherche des gains de productivité perdus depuis la crise sanitaire. Blog de l’INSEE. Available at: https://blog.insee.fr/la-productivite-du-travail-fr-depuis-la-c...0premier%20trimestre%202024,moyenne%20entre%202011%20et%202019.
Baccaro L., D'Antoni M. (2024). Tying your hands and getting stuck? The European origins of Italy's economic stagnation. Review of Political Economy, 36(3), 1104–1129.
Bachmann R., Baqaee D., Bayer C. et al. (2022). What if? The economic effects for Germany of a stop of energy imports from Russia. ECONtribute Policy Brief, 28.
Bagnai A. (2016). Italy’s decline and the balance-of-payments constraint: A multicountry analysis. International Review of Applied Economics, 30(1), 1–26.
Bagnai A., Mongeau Ospina C.A. (2014). The a/simmetrie annual macroeconometric model of the Italian economy: Structure and properties. a/ Working Papers Series 1405. Italian Association for the Study of Economic Asymmetries. Rome.
Bagnai I. (2012). Il Tramonto dell’euro. Regio Emillia, Imprimatur.
Bali M. (2018). The impact of economic sanctions on Russia and its six greatest European trade partners: A country SVAR analysis. Finansy i biznes=Finance & Business, 14(2), 45–67.
Bali M., Rapelanoro N. (2021). How to simulate international economic sanctions: A multipurpose index modelling illustrated with EU sanctions against Russia. International Economic, 168, 25–39.
Baqaee D., Moll B., Landais C., Martin P. (2022). The economic consequences of a stop of energy imports from Russia. Focus, 084-2022.
Batzella F. (2024). Slowly but surely? Assessing EU actorness in energy sanctions against Russia. Energy Policy, 192.
Bialek S., Schaffranka C., Schnitzer M. (2023). The energy crisis and the German manufacturing sector: Structural change but no broad deindustrialisation to be expected. VoxEU Column.
Bibow J., Terzi A. (Eds). (2007). Euroland and the World Economy: Global Player or Global Drag? New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Borin A., Conteduca F. P., Di Stefano E. et al. (2022). Quantitative assessment of the economic impact of the trade disruptions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Occasional Paper 700. Bank of Italy.
Bureau D., Glachant J.-M., Schubert K. (2023). Le triple défi de la réforme du marché Européen de l’electricité. Notes du Conseil d’Analyse Économique, 76, March.
Canelli R., Fontana G., Realfonzo R., Passarella M.V. (2024). Energy crisis, economic growth and public finance in Italy. Energy Economics, 132.
Chen Y., Lan T., Mineshima A., Zhou J. (2023). Impact of high energy prices on Germany’s potential output. IMF selected Papers SIP 2023/059. IMF, Washington D.C.
Chevallier M. (2023). La France se réindustrialise-t-elle ? Alternatives Économiques, 438, 60–61.
Cowie J., Heathcott J. (Eds). (2003). Beyond the Ruins. The Meanings of Deindustrialization. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Dalmasso A. (2017). Territoires et désindustrialisations: trajectoires d’entreprises et marginalisation territoriale. In: Daumas J.-C., Kharaba I., Mioche P. (Eds). La Désindustrialisation: une fatalité? Besançon: Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté.
Daveri F. (2012). La flessibilità parziale del mercato del lavoro, un inefficace sostituto della svalutazione. In: Messori M. (Ed.). Il modello di sviluppo dell’economia italiana quarant’anni dopo. Milano: Egea.
De Vries C.E., Hobolt S.B. (2020). Political Entrepreneurs and The Rise of Challenger Parties in Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Devulder A., Zuber T., Ducoudré B., Lemoine M. (2024). Explaining productivity losses observed in France since the pre-Covid period. Bulletin de la Banque de France, 251/1, March.
Di Martino P., Vasta M. (2015). Wealthy by accident? firm structure, institutions, and economic performance in 150(+4) years of Italian history: Introduction to the special forum. Enterprise & Society, 16(2), 215–224.
Dufourcq N. (2022). La désindustrialisation de la France 1995–2015. Paris: Odile Jacob.
Engler S. (2020). Centrist anti-establishment parties and their protest voters: More than a superficial romance? European Political Science Review,12(3), 307–325.
Faini R., Sapir A. (2005). Un modello obsoleto? Crescita e specializzazione dell’economia italiana. In: Oltre il decline. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Fletcher K., Kemp H., Sher G. (2024). Germany’s real challenges are aging, underinvestment, and too much red tape. IMF Country Focus. Washington DC: IMF. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/03/27/germanys-real-challenges-are-aging-underinvestment-and-too-much-red-tape
Fontaine M., Vigna X. (2019). La désindustrialisation, une histoire en cours. 20 & 21. Revue d'histoire, 144(4), 2–17.
Gasparotti A., Kullas M. (2019). L’Euro a 20 ans: qui sont les perdants, qui sont les gagnants. Freiburg Centrum für Europäische Politik. Available at: https://www.cep.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/cep.eu/Studien/20_Jahre_Euro_-_Gewinner_und_Verlierer/cepStudy_20_years_Euro_-_Winners_and_Losers.pdf
Giumelli F. (2017). The redistributive impact of restrictive measures on EU members: Winners and losers from imposing sanctions on Russia. Journal of Common Market Studies, March, 1–19.
Heyer E. (2022). La croissance manque d’énergie – perspective 2022–2023 pour l’économie française. Revue de l’OFCE, 178(3), 131–163.
Heyer É. (2023). Comment expliquer l’évolution de l’emploi salarié depuis la crise Covid? Une analyse économétrique sur données macro-sectorielles. Revue de l’OFCE, 180(2023/1), April.
Hidalgo Pérez M., Mateo Escobar R., Collado Van-Baumberghen N., Galindo J. (2022). Estimating the Effect of the Spanish Gas Price Cap for Electricity Generation. ESADE.
Huber F., Onorante L., Pfarrhofer M. (2024). Forecasting euro area inflation using a huge panel of survey expectations. International Journal of Forecasting, 40(3), 1042–1054.
Knodt M., Ringel M., Bruch N. (2024). Secure and sustainable? Unveiling the impact of the Russian war on EU energy governance. In: The War Against Ukraine and the EU: Facing New Realities. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland.
Krawczyk D., Martynets V., Opanasiuk Y., Rekunenko I. (2023). Socio-economic development of European countries in times of crisis: Ups and downs. Sustainability, 15(20), 14820.
Kuc-Czarnecka M., Markowicz I., Sompolska-Rzechuła A. (2023). SDGs implementation, their synergies, and trade-offs in EU countries – sensitivity analysis-based approach. Ecological Indicators, 146.
Lemoine M., Petronevich A., Zhutova A. (2024). Bouclier tarifaire sur les prix de l’énergie en France: quel bilan ? Bulletin de la Banque de France, 253/4, July–August.
Mingsong S. et al. (2024). The Russia-Ukraine conflict, soaring international energy prices, and implications for global economic policies. Heliyon, 10(16).
Moiseeva D.E. (2024). Multi-level governance in the EU: Institutional problems. World Economy and International Relations, 68(12), 80–87.
Mouhoud E.M. (2006). Mondialisation et délocalisation des entreprises. Paris: La Découverte.
Nabernegg M., Lange S., Kopp T. (2024). Inflation in Germany: Energy prices, profit shares, and market power in different sectors. International Journal of Political Economy, 53(4), 342–363.
Nikiforos M., Grothe S., Weber J.D. (2024). Markups, profit shares, and cost-push-profit-led inflation. Industrial and Corporate Change, 33(2), 342–362.
Pagano U. (2019), Proprietà e controllo delle grandi imprese: un’interpretazione del resistibile declino italiano. L’industria, 40(2), 223–251.
Pellegrino B., Zingales L. (2017). Diagnosing the Italian disease. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 23964.
Ragnitz J. (2022). Gewinninflation und Inflationsgewinner. IFO Institute, Dresden, December.
Rezaei Soufi H., Esfahanipour A., Akbarpour Shirazi M. (2022). A quantitative approach for analysis of macroeconomic resilience due to socio-economic shocks. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 79, 101101.
Rogoff K. (2024). Europe’s economy is stalling out. Project Syndicate. Available at: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/keynsian-...s-will-not-save-eu-economies-by-kenneth-rogoff-2024-11
Sánchez-García E., Martínez-Falcó J., Marco-Lajara B., Gigauri I. (2024). Building the future through digital entrepreneurship and innovation. European Journal of Innovation Management. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/EJIM-04-2024-0360
Sapir J. (2016). L’Euro contre la France, l’Euro contre l’Europe. Paris: Le Cerf.
Sapir J. (2021a). The economic shock of the health crisis in 2020: Comparing the scale of governments support. Studies on Russian Economic Development, 32(6), 579–592.
Sapir J. (2021b). Is eurozone accumulating an historic lag toward Asia in the Covid-19 context? Economic Revival of Russia,1(67), 89–102.
Sapir J. (2023). Wendet sich der Wirtschaftskrieg gegen Russland gegen seine Initiatoren? In: Luft S., Kostner S. (Eds). Ukrainekrieg. Warum Europa eine neue Entspannungspolitik braucht. Frankfurt am Main: Westend-Verlag.
Schilin A. (2024). EU or euro area crisis? Studying differentiated integration as an idea structuring elite perceptions of the sovereign debt and the COVID-19 crisis. Journal of European Integration, 46(1), 47–68.
Schmitz E., Matthes J. (2024). Konkurrenzdruck aus China für deutsche Firmen, IW-Report, Nr. 30. Köln.
Sidorova E.A. (2021). Fiscal Integration in the European Union. Moscow: Ves’ Mir. Available at: https://www.imemo.ru/publications/info/fiskalynaya-integratsiya-v- evropeyskom-soyuze-imemo-ran-im-em-primakova-moskva-izdatelystvo- vesy-mir-2021-200-s-isbn-978-5-7777-0850-2 (In Russian).
Strezhneva M. (2025), Institutional dynamics of fiscal integration in the European Union. World Eсonomy and International Relations, 69(4), 25–35.
Szczerbiak A., Taggart P. (2024). Euroscepticism and anti-establishment parties in Europe. Journal of European Integration, 46(8), 1171–1191.
Toniolo G. (2013). An overview of Italy’s economic growth. In: The Oxford Handbook of the Italian Economy since Unification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Van Bergeijk P.A.G. (2014). Russia’s tit for tat. VoxEU-CEPR. Available at: https://voxeu.org/article/russia-s-tit-tat
Vasilopoulou S., Talving L. (2023). Euroscepticism as a syndrome of stagnation? Regional inequality and trust in the EU. Journal of European Public Policy, 31(6), 1494–1515.
Weber I.M., Lara Jauregui J., Teixeira L., Nassif Pires L. (2024). Inflation in times of overlapping emergencies: Systemically significant prices from an input–output perspective. Industrial and Corporate Change, 33(2), 297–341.
Weber I.M., Wasner E. (2023). Sellers’ inflation, profits and conflict: Why can large firms hike prices in an emergency? Review of Keynesian Economics, 11(2), 183–213.
Zezza F., Zezza G. (2020). A stock-flow consistent quarterly model of the Italian Economy. Levy Institute Working Paper 958. Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.